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DEFINING INDIAN STATUS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Katharine C. Oakley*
At first glance, there appears to be something odd about a court of
law in a diverse nation such as ours deciding whether a specific
individual is or is not "an Indian." Yet, given the long and complex
relationship between the government of the United States and the
sovereign tribal nations within its borders, the criminal jurisdiction
of the federal government often turns on precisely this question-
whether a particular individual "counts" as an Indian.'
United States v. Cruz is the latest in a long line of cases where courts have
tried to determine who qualifies for Indian status for purposes of federal
criminal jurisdiction.2 Determining whether an individual qualifies for Indian
status under the Indian Country Crimes Acte and the Major Crimes Acte is
necessary to establish whether the tribal, state, or federal government has
jurisdiction in criminal cases where the crime occurs in Indian Country.'
Currently, there is no precise formula for courts to use to determine the
unequivocal meaning of Indian status.' In some federal Indian statutes,
Congress has provided a definition or guideline for determining who qualifies
for Indian status,' but no such definition exists for the Indian Country Crimes
Act or Major Crimes Act,' leaving state and federal courts without guidance
in making such determinations.
This comment will dissect the assorted approaches that state and federal
courts have used to determine who qualifies as an Indian for purposes of
federal criminal jurisdiction. The state and federal courts have used several
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
2. See id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
4. Id. § 1153.
5. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D. 1988).
6. See id. at 1461.
7. See COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 177-78 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (citations omitted); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN
ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 53 (Clay Smith ed., 2008) [hereinafter
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK]; infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
8. See COHEN, supra note 7, at 177-78 (citations omitted).
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different tests to approach the question, many applying similar factors' but
nonetheless reaching varied results." This comment will explore the various
approaches used to define Indian status and expose the inconsistencies that
arise even when courts apply the same test.
Part I provides a brief primer on relevant Indian law doctrines, outlining the
history of tribal-federal relations. Part II examines the current framework for
determining who qualifies for Indian status. Part III advances five approaches
to the Indian-status question. The proffered options are as follows: (1) an
individual-identification approach that considers the blood quantum of the
individual and whether the individual self-identifies as Indian; (2) a totality-of-
the-circumstances test that allows courts to consider all the facts before them,
with no one factor being dispositive; (3) an adaptation of the two-prong test
that most courts currently follow, originally set forth in United States v.
Rogers;" (4) a threshold test that first considers whether the tribe is federally
recognized before performing any type of analysis; and (5) a bright-line rule
that grants the tribes the exclusive authority to determine whether an
individual qualifies as an Indian, basing Indian status solely on tribal
membership. While each approach has its strengths and drawbacks, the
legislature must adopt a single, uniform standard with precise guidelines for
all courts consistently to follow. This comment concludes in Part IV.
I Understanding the Indian Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Statutes
A. History of Indian Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Statutes
To understand how courts have defined Indian status, it is first necessary to
understand the history behind the Indian criminal jurisdiction statutes, as well
as the special trust relationship between the federal government and the
Indians. As the court in United States v. Bruce12 eloquently stated, "The
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country is a 'complex
patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law,' which is better explained by
history than by logic.""
9. See United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005); LaPier v.
McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1993); St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1460-61.
10. Compare Sully v. United States, 195 F. 113, 117, 129 (D.C.S.D. 1912) (holding that
1/8 Indian blood is sufficient to qualify for Indian status), with Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77,
80 (Wyo. 1982) (holding that 1/8 Indian blood is insufficient to qualify for Indian status).
11. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
12. 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005).




Federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country can be traced to colonial
times when tribes had jurisdiction over all people present in Indian territory.
Following the American Revolution, the federal government extended federal
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
Country.14  In 1817, the federal government further extended federal
jurisdiction to include all crimes committed in Indian Country, with the
exception of those committed "by Indians against Indians," which were left to
the tribe.'" This jurisdictional extension is now codified in the Indian Country
Crimes Act.16
The Indian Country Crimes Act does not apply to crimes committed by
Indians against Indians, crimes committed by Indians that have been punished
by the tribe, or crimes over which a treaty gives exclusive jurisdiction to the
tribe.17 After Ex parte Crow Dog,'8 in which an Indian murdered another
Indian and the federal government was unable to exercise jurisdiction,
Congress perceived a deficiency in the jurisdictional reach of the Indian
Country Crimes Act. It thereupon passed the Major Crimes Act,'9 giving the
federal government jurisdiction over Indians who commit one of fifteen major
crimes against any person within Indian Country.2o The enactment of the
Major Crimes Act limited the tribal courts' jurisdiction to only misdemeanors
where the offender and the victim are both Indians,2 1 and gave the federal
14. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 148 (5th ed. 2009).
15. Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
17. Id.
18. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
20. CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 149-50. These fifteen offenses include:
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under 109A, incest, assault
with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting
in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 ofthis title), an assault against
an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or
neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
21. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts andFederal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403,410
(2004). While tribes may prosecute serious offenses as well, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006), limited tribal court sentences to a fine ofno more than $5,000 and
only up to one year in prison. Federal law classifies crimes according to the years of
imprisonment allowed for the punishment. Despite that the tribes could prosecute felonies such
as murder, they could impose only a misdemeanor sentence, which meant that the crimes over
which the tribes exercise jurisdiction could be characterized only as misdemeanors. Therefore,
when a tribe prosecuted an individual for murder, it was only a misdemeanor. Washburn,
supra, at 410-1 & n.32. Recently, Congress provided tribal courts the opportunity to prosecute
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government exclusive jurisdiction over the fifteen enumerated felonies
committed by one Indian against another Indian.22 Under this statute, "[t]he
Indian status of the defendant is an element of the crime that must be alleged
in the indictment and proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt."23
From this, the court in Bruce recognized that "the question of who is an Indian
bears significant legal consequences." 24 Determining whether an individual
qualifies as an Indian therefore is much more than a matter of labeling, but
also determines which court has jurisdiction over him. While jurisdictional
confusion remains at the forefront of the discussion, the federal trust
relationship requires that the federal government's role as guardian influence
the ultimate choice of which test best protects the rights of the Indians.
B. Trust Relationship with the Federal Government
The federal government "has a special trust relationship with Native
Americans under which the United States bears a particular responsibility for
preserving and protecting the Indian people."2  To carry out this
responsibility, "Congress has 'plenary power' over Native Americans."26
Congress has passed several laws to carry out its responsibility, including the
Indian Country Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act.2 7 Bcause these statutes
are creatures of the special trust relationship with the federal government, most
courts will only confer Indian status on those individuals affiliated with a
federally recognized tribe.28
individuals for felonies with the enactment of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010. This
amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act now allows tribal courts to impose sentences with an
increased fine of no more than $15,000, and increased sentencing of up to three years in prison.
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C). For tribal courts to take advantage of this increased sentencing,
however, the individual previously must have been convicted for a similar offense that would
be punishable by imprisonment of more than one year were it prosecuted in state or federal
court. Id. § 1302(b). In addition, under the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, tribal courts may
not impose a total punishment of more than nine years for all offenses being prosecuted. Id. §
1302(a)(7)(D). This means that even if the individual committed ten separate crimes carrying
a sentence of one year for each crime, the tribal court is limited to sentencing the individual to
nine years in prison. Despite that tribal courts now have some increased sentencing power, they
are still significantly limited as to the punishments they can impose.
22. Washburn, supra note 21, at 411.
23. CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 183.
24. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005).
25. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D. 1988).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 10; see INDIAN ENTYrIEs RECOGNIZED AND ELIGIBLE TO
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss1/12
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William Canby explains that "[i]n the jurisdictional context, individual
status follows tribal status, and there can be no Indian without a tribe."2 9 If the
tribe to which an individual is claiming membership is not federally
recognized or has lost its recognition, the federal government does not have a
protective responsibility and the Indian Country Crimes Act and Major Crimes
Act will not apply."o This special relationship also goes the other way -
Indians have a special status as wards of the federal government, and it is
under this protective status that federal jurisdiction is based. An Indian's
special status may therefore terminate if an individual who is racially Indian
decides to sever tribal relations and assume a non-Indian lifestyle.3
C. Why Does It Matter?
When a crime occurs in Indian Country, the legal status of the defendant
and the victim determine which court may exercise jurisdiction.32 Whether the
tribal or the federal court has jurisdiction over the case can significantly alter
the outcome and punishment received." Tribal courts historically are much
less formal than the federal and state courts in their practices and procedures.34
Moreover, with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and its
recent amendments through the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, tribal
courts are limited to sentences not exceeding one year's imprisonment and a
$5,000 fine," or three year's imprisonment and a $15,000 fine if certain
prerequisites are satisfied.3 6 An individual facing prosecution for a crime
carrying sizeable state or federal court penalties would thus ostensibly rather
face trial in a tribal court where the penalties are capped. But while tribal
court would appear to be more favorable to many defendants, there are also
times when a defendant instead may wish to be tried in state or federal court.
For instance, if a defendant committed a crime that is strongly admonished by
tribal members, he presumably would not wish to be tried in front of an
RECEIVE SERVICES FROM THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,218
(Aug. 11, 2009), available athttp://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/text/idc002655.
pdf (providing a list of the 564 federally recognized tribes).
29. CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 10.
30. Id.
31. State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990).
32. See Washburn, supra note 21, at 410.
33. See CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 190.
34. Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 503, 560 (1976).
35. CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 190.
36. See supra note 21.
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adverse tribunal.3 ' That individual may perceive himself to be more likely to
receive a fair trial in federal court. To avoid bestowing defendants with the
ability to influence sentencing through favorable forum selection, it is
important for Congress to provide a single, uniform test to be followed by all
courts in reaching determinations of whether an individual qualifies for Indian
status.
II Defining Who Is an Indian
A. How Indian Is Defined in Federal Statutes
There is no single statutory definition for Indian to be used for all federal
purposes. Some statutes include a definition of Indian, while others provide
no such definition, leaving the determination to the courts. 8 For those statutes
that do contain a definition for Indian, the definitions vary greatly among
them." Courts left with the task (in the absence of an explicit statutory
definition for "Indian") of inventing their own definition must decide which
formulation is appropriate in the given context.
Under the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975,40 Indian is defined as "a
person who is a member of an Indian tribe."4 ' The definition of "Indian tribe,"
however, limits the Act's reach to only members of "those tribes recognized
as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States
to Indians because of their status as Indians."42
The Indian Reorganization Act 43 defines Indian for purposes of land
ownership and allotment. The definition is based solely on ancestry and reads
as follows:
The term "Indian" as used in this Act shall include all persons of
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe
now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing
within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall
further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.
37. This hypothetical assumes that the crime committed would be unlikely to elicit a
sentence exceeding the prescribed maximum tribal sentence were it tried in federal court.
38. COHEN, supra note 7, at 177.
39. Id.
40. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458 (2006).
41. Id. § 450b(d).
42. COHEN, supra note 7, at 178.
43. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2006).
18 2 [ Vol. 35
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For the purposes of this Act, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples
of Alaska shall be considered Indians."
Under this definition, there is no requirement that the individual be affiliated
with a tribe if he has the requisite amount of Indian blood.
The Indian Child Welfare Act45 provides an entirely different definition,
defining an Indian child as "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen
and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.""
Curiously, "[t]he term 'member' is not further defined, and whether the term
is to be limited to officially enrolled members, or instead encompasses
individuals who are not formally enrolled but are recognized to be members
of the tribal community, has yet to be resolved."'
The Indian Financing Act48 provides yet another definition for Indian. It
states that "'Indian' means any person who is a member of any Indian tribe,
band, group, pueblo, or community which is recognized by the Federal
Government as eligible for services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs."'
All of these statutory definitions for Indian vary depending on the context
of the law. Some federal statutes, however, do not provide any definition for
Indian, such as the Indian Country Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act, which
leave the definitional question for the courts to determine.
B. How State and Federal Courts Define Indian Status for Criminal
Jurisdiction
There is no single, precise test that the state and federal courts universally
employ to determine Indian status. There is one test, however, that frequently
emerges in the cases and that the courts have applied in various capacities.
This two-prong test was first developed in United States v. Rogers."o Courts
have with less frequency used other tests, including a threshold test, as well as
the tests set forth in United States v. Pemberton (which considers whether the
44. Id. § 479.
45. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006).
46. Id. § 1903(4).
47. COHEN, supra note 7, at 178-79.
48. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (2006).
49. Id. § 1452(b).
50. 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846).
183No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
individual identifies himself as Indian)" and LaPier v. McCormick (which asks
a threshold question before performing any type of analysis).52
1. United States v. Rogers Two-Prong Test
The defendant in United States v. Rogers was a white man who voluntarily
moved to Cherokee country and made it his domicile. He "incorporated"
himself into the tribe, and the Cherokee tribe "recognized" and "adopted" him.
He "exercised all the rights and privileges of a Cherokee Indian" and "became
a citizen of the Cherokee Nation." 3 Although the Cherokee tribe recognized
Rogers as a member of the Cherokee Nation and entitled him to all the
privileges associated with tribal membership, the Court found that he was not
an Indian.54 The Court explained that the Indian status exception was intended
for those individuals "who by the usages and customs of the Indians are
regarded as belonging to their race."ss The Court noted that Indian "does not
speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally, -of the family of
Indians."" State and federal courts have lifted the holding in Rogers to
formulate a two-prong test for determining Indian status." The first prong
requires that the defendant have Indian blood, and the second requires that the
defendant have tribal or federal recognition as an Indian."
a) First Prong: Indian-Blood Requirement
The first prong of the Rogers test requires a showing of Indian blood, but
gives no indication of what degree of Indian blood is in fact required. Courts
use interchanging language in this prong, leading to disparate results with
respect to what constitutes the appropriate degree of Indian blood."
51. United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005).
52. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1993).
53. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571.
54. Id. at 573.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Weston Meyring, "I'm an Indian Outlaw, Half Cherokee and Choctaw": Criminal
Jurisdiction and the Question ofIndian Status, 67 MONT. L. REv. 177, 186 (2006).
58. United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449,456 (7th Cir. 1984); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d
983, 986 (Mont. 1990); Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
59. See United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009) (requiring some Indian
blood to qualify for Indian status); State v. Reber, 171 P.3d 406, 410 (Utah 2007) (requiring
significant Indian blood to qualify for Indian status); Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo.




Some courts require that the individual possess a significant amount of
Indian blood.o The courts requiring a significant degree of Indian blood have
found that individuals possessing 165/5126' and slightly less than one-quarter
(1/4)62 Indian blood meet the significant-Indian-blood requirement. In another
case, a court found that one-sixteenth (1/16) Indian blood was insufficient to
satisfy the significant-Indian-blood requirement." The court noted that in a
previous case, it held that "a person 'with less than one-half Indian blood [can
qualify as having] a significant degree of Indian blood"' but that it had "found
no case in which a court has held that 1/16th Indian blood . .. qualifies as a
'significant degree of Indian blood."'"
Other courts have applied a different standard, requiring the individual to
possess some Indian blood.65 Under this requirement, courts have found that
individuals possessing 3/32 66 and 15/32" of Indian blood satisfied the some-
Indian-blood requirement of the first prong. Two other courts found that one-
fourth (1/4) Indian blood constituted having some Indian blood.6 8 These courts
provided no guidance as to why they found these percentages of Indian blood
to be sufficient. The court in United States v. Bruce attempted to clarify
specifically what is required under the first prong, explaining,
The first prong requires ancestry living in America before the
Europeans arrived, but this fact is obviously rarely provable as
such.... Because the general requirement is only of "some" blood,
evidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is
clearly identified as an Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy this
prong.69
60. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); LaPier, 790 P.2d at
986; Goforth, 644 P.2d at 116; Reber, 171 P.3d at 410.
61. See LaPier, 790 P.2d at 986-87.
62. See Goforth, 644 P.2d at 116.
63. See Reber, 171 P.3d at 410-11.
64. Id. at 410 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 933 (Utah
1992)).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456,
1460 (D.S.D. 1988).
66. Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 762.
67. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1460.
68. See Dodge, 538 F.2d at 786-87 (citing Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam Cnty., 440 P.2d
442 (Wash. 1968)).
69. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005).
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The Bruce court held that an individual who possessed one-eighth (1/8) Indian
blood met the some-Indian-blood requirement.70
Requiring an individual to have only some Indian blood appears to be a
much more lenient standard than requiring significant Indian blood. It appears
that an individual only possessing one-sixteenth (1/16) Indian blood may be
able to meet the first prong in a court requiring a person to have some Indian
blood, but not in a court requiring significant Indian blood.
In other courts, an individual is required to possess a substantial amount of
Indian blood to qualify for Indian status." Substantial logically seems to
require an amount greater than significant and most certainly greater than
some. The court in Vialpando v. State attempted to define what qualifies as a
substantial amount of Indian blood. The court first looked to Webster's
Dictionary, which defined substantial as "being that specified to a large degree
... or relating to the main part of something."72 The court also looked to
another case in an attempt to define substantial, which stated that
the word "substantial" is a relative and not exact term subject to a
rule of thumb. It is susceptible of different meanings according to
the circumstances of its use. In considering the word, it must be
examined in its relation and context, and its meaning gauged by all
the surrounding circumstances."
These definitions indicate the ambiguity that can result from using a term with
no definitive meaning. Based on its understanding of the term substantial, the
Vialpando court found that an individual with one-eighth (1/8) Indian blood
did not meet the substantial-Indian-blood requirement.74 Alternatively,
another court found that an individual with a full-blooded Indian mother and
a half-blooded Indian father satisfied the substantial-Indian-blood
requirement.75 Courts requiring substantial Indian blood appear to have a
much more rigorous requirement than other courts. This fact is evidenced by
a court requiring some Indian blood finding 3/32 to meet that requirement,76
70. Id. at 1224, 1227.
71. See, e.g., Pero v. Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31(7th Cir. 1938); Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77,
79-80 (Wyo. 1982).
72. Vialpando, 640 P.2d at 80 (quoting WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 2280 (3d ed. 1966)).
73. Id. (quoting Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, 160 N.W.2d 492, 498 (1968)).
74. Id.
75. Pero, 99 F.2d at 31.




but a court requiring a substantial amount finding one-eighth (1/8) to be
insufficient.
Despite the already well-documented inconsistencies, other courts have
adopted yet another interpretation of the first prong, requiring a sufficient
degree of Indian blood.' Under this standard, the Cruz court found 29/128
Indian blood to be a sufficient amount of Indian blood to satisfy the first
prong." The court provided no explanation as to why 29/128 met the
sufficient-Indian-blood requirement - just a statement that the defendant
satisfied the first prong of the test.80
The state and federal cases collectively seem to indicate that a blood
requirement of more than one-sixteenth (1/16) will be required to satisfy the
first prong of the Rogers test."' The different terminology used by each court
- whether it be sufficient, signficant, substantial, or some - indicates a varying
degree of Indian blood required for the first prong. While the blood
requirement is interpreted and applied with little consistency, the second prong
of the Rogers test generates an even greater degree of inconsistency in its
application and the resulting conclusions.
b) Second Prong: Recognized as an Indian by a Tribe or the Federal
Government
The second prong of the Rogers test has been described as "a sufficient non-
racial link to a formerly sovereign people."82 Courts have made clear that, by
itself, having some Indian blood is not sufficient to establish Indian status
because federal criminal jurisdiction is based on status rather than race." The
language used by most courts in the second prong is consistently the same,
requiring that the individual be "recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the
federal government."84 Yet, the factors used to determine the second prong
and the weight given to those factors varies greatly among the courts." Some
77. See Vialpando, 640 P.2d at 80.
78. See e.g., United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2009).
79. See id. at 843, 845-46.
80. Id. at 846.
81. See Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 762; Cruz, 554 F.3d at 846; State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983,
986-87 (Mont. 1990); State v. Reber, 171 P.3d 406, 410 (Utah 2007).
82. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
83. Id.
84. Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 762; United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir.
2001) (quoting Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Torres,
733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); LaPier, 790 P.2d at 986.
85. See infra notes 89, 90, 105-06, 121-25, 127-31 and accompanying text.
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courts guide their analysis using the factors set forth in St. Cloud v. United
States, while others conduct their own form of analysis."
(1) Courts Using the St. Cloud Factors
In St. Cloud v. United States, the court examined four factors, in declining
order of importance, to guide its analysis as to whether the individual had
tribal or federal recognition as an Indian: "1) enrollment in a tribe; 2)
government recognition formally and informally through providing the person
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation;
and 4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation and
participating in Indian social life."" The court explained that "[t]hese factors
do not establish a precise formula for determining who is an Indian. Rather,
they merely guide the analysis of whether a person is recognized as an
Indian."88 In evaluating the four St. Cloud factors, some courts have strictly
adhered to examining the factors in declining order of importance,89 while
others have considered the factors collectively.90
Under the first factor, courts consider whether the individual is enrolled in
a tribe." This is the most important factor to consider, and for some courts,
being an enrolled member of a tribe is itself sufficient to satisfy the second
prong of the test.92 Other courts have emphasized that while "[t]ribal
enrollment is 'the common evidentiary means of establishing Indian status, []
it is not the only means nor is it necessarily determinative.'"9 One reason for
tribal enrollment not necessarily being "determinative" is that many courts will
only confer Indian status on those individuals enrolled or associated with a
federally recognized tribe. Even if the individual is enrolled in a tribe, federal
recognition of the tribe is required both for the trust relationship to exist and
86. See infra notes 87-89, 127-30 and accompanying text.
87. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009); LaPier, 790 P.2d
at 986.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that
the factors should not be considered in any order of importance "unless the defendant is an
enrolled tribal member, in which case that factor becomes dispositive").
91. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
92. See, e.g., Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764; Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App.
2002).
93. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979)).
188 [Vol. 3 5
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for the individual to be recognized as an Indian for purposes of federal
criminal jurisdiction."4
In the absence of actual membership in a federally recognized tribe, courts
will consider in their examination of the first factor whether the individual is
eligible for or has ever sought enrollment in a federally recognized tribe.95 In
a case arising in Idaho, the court noted that the individual did not have any
interest in enrolling in the tribe until after his conviction in the criminal case,
suggesting that the defendant only sought Indian status because it was
favorable to his circumstance. While seeking enrollment in a federally
recognized tribe may be a "plus factor" in some cases, courts are wary of the
potential for abuse.
Overall, most courts using the Rogers test have indicated that "enrollment
in a tribe is not an absolute requirement for recognition as an Indian."' If the
individual is not enrolled in a federally recognized tribe, the courts will
examine the remaining three factors to determine whether he still qualifies for
Indian status.98
Under the second factor, courts consider whether the federal government
formally or informally recognizes the individual by providing him with
assistance reserved only for Indians." In one case, an individual received
educational assistance and health benefits through Native American programs.
Some of these programs, however, were not reserved only for Indians,
rendering the receipt of such benefits insufficient to fully satisfy the second
factor.' 0 In another case, the individual received federal housing assistance,
but the court noted that such assistance was provided only because he was
married to a tribal member."o' Courts have also considered whether the
individual has ever sought federal assistance on account of his Indian status.
If no such assistance has been sought, the evidence weighs against the
individual qualifying for Indian status.'02 If the individual is unable to show
94. See St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1466.
95. See Lewis, 55 P.3d at 878; State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 987 (Mont. 1990).
96. Lewis, 55 P.3d at 878.
97. Id.; Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 766 ("[E]nrollment 'is not the only means [of establishing
Indian status] nor is it necessarily determinative."') (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005)); LaPier, 790 P.2d at 987 ("[Tlhat Mr.
LaPier is not enrolled in any tribe may not be determinative of Indian status.").
98. See State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 24-25 (Conn. 1997); LaPier, 790 P.2d at 987.
99. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
100. See LaPier, 790 P.2d at 988.
101. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1462.
102. See, e.g., Lewis, 55 P.3d at 878.
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an application for or receipt of federal assistance reserved only for Indians, he
must be able to make a strong showing under the last two factors to qualify for
Indian status.'o3
Under the third factor, courts consider whether the individual has enjoyed
any benefits of tribal affiliation.'" The St. Cloud court found the third factor
satisfied because the defendant had "participated in a tribal alcohol treatment
and counseling program" and "obtained employment" with the help of the
tribe."o' The Cruz court, on the other hand, urged the necessity of conducting
an analysis from both the individual and tribal perspective.'06 In Cruz, the
defendant "attended [] public school on the reservation" and "worked as a
firefighter for the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs," but both were "open to
non-Indians."0  The court noted that the defendant was eligible for tribal
benefits, but had never taken advantage of them. 08 The court explained that
"mere eligibility for benefits is of no consequence under [the factors]."0 9
Ultimately, the court decided that while the tribe recognized Cruz as an Indian,
Cruz's failure to take advantage of the tribal benefits indicated that he did not
self-identify as an Indian."0
Under the fourth and final factor, courts consider whether the individual has
"social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation and
participating in Indian social life.""' One court found that an individual
satisfied the fourth factor by living on the reservation, participating in tribal
social life and community, and considering himself an Indian."2 In another
case, the court found that the defendant had only partially satisfied the fourth
factor."' Although he lived on the reservation as a child and at the time of his
arrest, he had never participated in Indian social life, such as attending
festivals and social activities or practicing Indian religion.114 Yet another court
found that a defendant did not establish his racial status as an Indian because,
103. See United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2009).
104. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
105. Id. at 1462.
106. Cruz, 554 F.3d at 850.
107. Id. at 847.
108. Id. at 846.
109. Id. at 847.
110. See id. at 848.
111. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
112. Id. at 1462.





among other factors, the defendant did not live on the reservation, but instead
in a trailer adjacent to the reservation." 5
Other elements courts consider under the fourth factor include whether the
individual identifies himself as Indian to others"6 and whether the individual
has been arrested by tribal authorities throughout his life.' '7 This latter type
of evidence is important because tribes do not have jurisdiction to punish non-
Indians and therefore may punish only Indians."' Consequently,
demonstrating that an individual has been arrested by tribal authorities
throughout his life is strong evidence of tribal recognition."' The court in
Bruce explained that "[t]he assumption and exercise of a tribe's criminal
jurisdiction, while not conclusive evidence of Indian status, significantly
bolsters the argument that [the defendant] met her burden of producing
sufficient evidence upon which a jury might rationally conclude that she was
an Indian." 20 While an individual may satisfy any number of the factors, the
courts consider all the evidence collectively to determine whether an
individual qualifies for Indian status.
Although most courts consider many of the same elements in determining
whether the individual satisfies the St. Cloud factors, courts do not always give
the same weight to each factor, thus reaching inconsistent holdings. The court
in Stymiest found that the defendant satisfied the second prong of the Rogers
test despite that he satisfied only the third and fourth St. Cloud factors. He
lived and worked on the reservation, submitted himself to tribal arrests, and
identified himself as an Indian to others."' The court in Bruce similarly found
that a defendant failing to meet the first or second St. Cloud factors was Indian
because she lived on the reservation, was treated by Indian Health Services,
and had been arrested by tribal authorities during her life.' 22 Conversely, the
court in Cruz was unwilling to confer Indian status on a defendant who
attended school and worked on the reservation, was eligible for tribal benefits,
115. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982).
116. United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that an individual
met the fourth St. Cloud factor because, in addition to living on the reservation, he also
identified himself as an Indian to others, including Indian Health Services, his Indian girlfriend,
and other Indians with whom he socialized on the reservation).
117. See id.; United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2005).
118. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 1022-23 (1978).
119. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1227.
120. Id.
121. Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 766.
122. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1227.
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and had lived on the reservation as a child.123 The court determined that the
defendant had not satisfied the three most important factors and had only
partially satisfied the fourth.124 The court stated that "[t]he first three factors
could not realistically be deemed more important than the fourth if a partial
satisfaction of the fourth could outweigh the complete failure to satisfy any of
the first three."l 25 The holdings in these cases illustrate the inconsistency that
can result from courts in the same circuit, even when using the same factors
to evaluate the second prong.126
(2) Analysis Other than St. Cloud
Some courts that have used the Rogers test did not use the St. Cloud factors
to guide their analysis for the second prong. These courts did not consider
specific factors, but instead considered all of the evidence collectively before
reaching a decision as to whether the individual qualified for Indian status.
In State v. Perank, the court did not have as detailed an analysis under the
second prong as those courts using the St. Cloud factors. The court, however,
believed there was sufficient evidence provided to find the second prong of the
Rogers test satisfied.' The court found the defendant had lived as an Indian
"by maintaining social, political, and spiritual relations as an Indian." 28 The
court did not bind itself to considering only the St. Cloud factors, and as a
result placed more emphasis on the defendant's involvement in the Indian
lifestyle through taking part in Indian rituals.129 The court also noted that the
defendant previously was convicted in tribal court.'30 These few pieces of
evidence were sufficient to find that the defendant qualified as an Indian."'
By failing to structure its analysis, however, the same court could easily
123. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2009).
124. Id. at 848.
125. Id. at 849.
126. For more examples of courts applying the factors inconsistently, see Vialpando v. State,
640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982) (refusing to confer Indian status on defendant because he only
partially satisfied one of the factors, and noting that defendant "seeks the best of two worlds and
would have this court place him in limbo, not subject to prosecution by either the federal
government or the state"); Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (finding that
living on the reservation for a short time and once attending an Indian festival was not enough
to meet the second prong of the Rogers test).








produce inconsistent holdings - the precise consequence the courts need to
avoid.
The court in United States v. Keys'32 similarly opted against using the St.
Cloud factors, but instead addressed how the analysis under the second prong
should be conducted when the individual is a child.' The child in this case
was two years old and, though not enrolled in a tribe, was eligible for
enrollment. The court explained that the child's "lack of enrollment at the age
of two does not control the determination of her 'Indian' status."l34 In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "[i]f an adult or older child is
eligible to enroll in an Indian tribe but fails to do so, perhaps an inference can
be drawn that the individual intentionally chooses not to affiliate politically
with the tribe."' In this case, however, the court determined that because she
"was a two-year old and incapable of enrolling herself, no such inference can
be drawn."' 3 6
Eligibility for enrollment is similarly important to keep in mind as courts
are evaluating whether adults meet the second prong of the test. Courts have
held that enrollment is not necessary to satisfy the second prong of the test.'
But if the individual is not enrolled in a tribe and is eligible for enrollment, one
must ask, Why have they not enrolled?
State and federal courts frequently use the Rogers test to determine whether
an individual has Indian status for federal criminal jurisdiction. Each court
applies the test differently, leading to inconsistent holdings. That the courts
use the Rogers test with the most frequency does not speak to its utility. Other
courts have followed approaches that may provide a better framework for
defining Indian status.
2. United States v. Pemberton Test
In United States v. Pemberton, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals used a
slightly different test than the Rogers court. While the tests are similar, the
approach to the second prong differs. The Pemberton test states that
"defendants who hold themselves out to be Indians and who are of Indian
blood are Indians under § 1153."'3 The Rogers test "asks whether the
132. 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996).
133. See id. at 761.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 760.
136. Id.
137. E.g., Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
138. United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005).
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defendant (1) has some Indian blood, and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a
tribe or the federal government or both."13 9 The two tests appear to be asking
the same questions, but the court in Pemberton interpreted the non-racial prong
differently. The Pemberton court asked whether the individual identified
himself as an Indian - not whether a tribe or the federal government did. For
this reason, the court held that enrollment in a tribe is not "necessarily
determinative" of an individual's Indian status. What matters to the
Pemberton court is not whether a tribe recognizes the individual as an Indian,
but whether that individual holds himself out to be an Indian through his
actions. 4 0
Using this approach, the Pemberton court found that the defendant
identified himself as an Indian. In so finding, the court noted that Pemberton's
parents were Indians and that "his mother was an enrolled member."41
Pemberton also "attended grade school and high school on the reservation,"
and lived on the reservation for a significant period of time.14 2 Pemberton
testified that although he was not an enrolled member of a tribe, he
"considered himself an Indian." 43  These findings were sufficient for
Pemberton to satisfy the non-racial prong of the analysis and qualify for Indian
status.'"
The Pemberton court did not provide any guidance for how to determine
whether an individual has sufficient Indian blood to satisfy the first prong of
the test. The language provided by the court indicates that the defendant must
be "of Indian blood," 45 which seems to be a much more lenient standard than
under the Rogers test. The only semblance of a benchmark that can be gleaned
is that Pemberton's parents were both Indian, which was sufficient to meet the
Indian-blood requirement in this case.'"
Together, the Pemberton and Stymiest cases demonstrate the Eighth
Circuit's inconsistent analysis in determining Indian status. Unlike the
Pemberton court, the court in Stymiest used the Rogers test to guide its
analysis of whether an individual qualifies for Indian status. 14' The conflicting
139. United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009).
140. Pemberton, 405 F.3d at 660.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 658.
144. Id. at 660.
145. Id.
146. Id.




tests within a single circuit present further evidence of the inconsistencies in
the judicial attempt to define Indian status.
3. LaPier v. McCormick Test
In LaPier v. McCormick, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the factors in the
second prong with a slightly different approach, using a threshold test. The
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that what should be a routine analysis is
complicated by the ambiguous definitions for who qualifies as an Indian.'48
The court stated that a threshold question must first be answered, which asks
whether "the Indian group with which [the defendant] claims affiliation [is] a
federally acknowledged Indian tribe." 4 9 If the answer is no, the Ninth Circuit
avers that the inquiry ends because "[a] defendant whose only claim of
membership or affiliation is with an Indian group that is not a federally
acknowledged Indian tribe cannot be an Indian for criminal jurisdiction
purposes."' The court explained the policy behind this reasoning, stating that
"in dealing with Indians," the federal government has a special responsibility
toward a "certain social-political group[]" and not primarily the Indian race.'
The court noted that "legislation treating Indians distinctively" is based on "the
unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law," where the federal
government assumed a "guardian" status to act "on behalf of [the] federally
recognized Indian tribes."'5 2 "It is therefore the existence of the special
relationship between the federal government and the tribe in question that
determines whether to subject the individual Indians affiliated with that tribe
to exclusive federal jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian country."'5 3
The Ninth Circuit determined that it is to be left to the political branches to
determine whether such a special relationship exists with a tribe. 54
Recognizing the need for the existence of the trust relationship for federal
criminal jurisdiction, the court found that the individual did not have Indian
status because the tribe to which he was claiming affiliation was not federally
148. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304 (9th Cir. 1993).
149. Id. at 304-05; see also State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 26 (Conn. 1997).
150. LaPier, 986 F.2d at 305.
151. Id. (quoting United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974)).
152. Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Sebastian, 701 A.2d at 29 (stating that where a tribe has an application
pending for federal recognition, it is not the responsibility of a state court in criminal
prosecution to determine whether the tribe will be federally recognized, but instead the agency
to which Congress delegated the responsibility to make that determination).
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recognized.'55 The court explained that "while LaPier may be an Indian in an
anthropological or ethnohistorical sense, he is not an Indian for purposes of
criminal jurisdiction."' 56
C. Tribal Requirements for Membership
To determine how to define "Indian" for purposes of criminal jurisdiction,
it is also important to understand how tribes define who is eligible for
membership in their individual tribes. One must remember that there is a
difference between the terms "Indian" and "tribal member." Courts use the
term Indian to refer to those individuals who qualify under certain statutes. A
tribal member, on the other hand, is an individual that the tribe has accepted
into membership based on the requirements set forth by each tribe.'" The
requirements for membership vary among the tribes. Some tribes have a
specific blood requirement for membership eligibility, while others accept any
degree of Indian blood."' Most tribes list their requirements for membership
in their tribal constitutions."'
155. LaPier, 986 F.2d at 306 (stating that "[t]he Little Shell Band of Landless Chippewa
Indians of Montana is not a federally acknowledged tribe of Indians").
156. Id
157. AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 7, at 49.
158. See Tribal Membership, OKLA. INDIAN LEGAL SERVS. INC., http://thorpe.ou.edu/OILS/
blood.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
159. Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views ofIndian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITr. L. REv. 1, 86 (1993).
The Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Montana's constitution confers
membership to "any blood member of the Blackfeet Tribe" born prior to the membership
amendment who maintains a legal residence on the reservation from birth. An amendment also
gives membership to "[aill children having one-fourth (1/4) degree of Blackfeet Indian blood
or more born after the adoption of [the] amendment to any blood member of the Blackfeet
Tribe." BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. b,
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/blackfeet/bfcontTOC.html. The St. Croix
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin provides membership in its constitution to those individuals
with one-half (1/2) or more Indian blood born to members who live on the St. Croix Indian
Reservation. Its constitution also notes that those who were not living on the reservation when
the constitution was adopted may apply for membership so long as they relinquish membership
with any other tribe in which they may also be enrolled. ST. CROIX CHIPPEWA INDIANS OF
WISCONSIN CONST. art. Ill, available at http://thorpe.ou.eduIlRA/croixcons.html. The Ute
Mountain Tribe ofthe Ute Mountain Reservation similarly requires individuals to have one-half
(1/2) or more of Ute Indian blood and be born to any member of the tribe. UTE MOUNTAIN
TRIBE OF THE UTE MOUNTAIN RESERVATION CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. b, available at
http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/utemtcons.html. Membership in the Turtle Mountain Band of




Tribes generally have less stringent requirements to qualify for membership
than the requirements set forth by the courts as necessary to qualify for Indian
status for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. Most tribes recognize an
individual as an Indian so long as he has Indian blood, though the amount of
Indian blood required varies among the tribes.160 An approach simply
requiring Indian blood differs greatly from any of the approaches set forth by
the courts, which examine a variety of factors in addition to considering
whether the individual has Indian blood. It is the vast differences between the
application of these factors that result in inconsistent findings for who qualifies
as an Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction.
III. Alternatives or Suggested Approaches
There are many different tests and approaches used by the courts to define
Indian status, and, as already demonstrated, the variant tests result in
inconsistent holdings. To provide a more effective and consistent method for
deciding whether an individual qualifies as an Indian, it is necessary to
develop an approach uniformly to be followed by all courts.
There are several different approaches that potentially could be used as the
universal test for determining Indian status. First, there is an individual-
identification test that first considers the individual's blood quantum and then
whether the individual self-identifies as Indian. Second, there is a totality-of-
the-circumstances test, where no single factor is dispositive in determining the
individual's Indian status. Third, there is a variation of the Rogers test already
used by many courts. Fourth, there is a threshold test that first considers
whether the tribe is federally recognized before examining the individual's
possess one-fourth (1/4) or more Indian blood. There is a further requirement that descendants
cannot be domiciled in Canada. TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS CONST. art.
III, § 1, cl. b, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/Turtlemtn/TMconst.html. The
Cherokee Nation has much less stringent requirements for membership, making it available to
those with any degree of Cherokee Indian blood who are descendants of a tribal member.
TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP, supra note 158. The Colorado River Indian Tribes have different
requirements for membership depending on whether the individual's parent was residing on the
reservation at the time of his birth. Every child born to a Colorado River Indian tribe member
is eligible for membership so long as his member parent was living on the reservation at the
time of his birth. If the member parent was not living on the reservation at the time of his birth,
the child must have one-half (1/2) or more Indian blood to be eligible for membership.
COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBE CONST. art. II, § I available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/
colcons.html.
160. See TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP, supra note 158.
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characteristics. The final option is a bright-line test, leaving it to the various
tribes to determine whether an individual qualifies for Indian status.
A. Individual-Identification Approach
The first type of test that could be employed is the individual-identification
approach. Under this test, the court would first consider whether the
individual has any Indian blood, followed by a second inquiry examining
whether the individual self-identifies as Indian. Considering these two factors
in concert, the court can make a determination as to whether the individual
qualifies for Indian status. The Eighth Circuit used a similar approach in
United States v. Pemberton, where the court relied heavily on the admission
by the defendant that he considered himself an Indian."'
This test provides for a simple analysis by the courts. The first question is
straightforward - a person either does or does not have Indian blood. The
second inquiry is equally straightforward - a person either does or does not
consider himself an Indian. Other factors, such as whether the defendant
receives tribal benefits or leads an Indian lifestyle, are not considered. It is for
the individual to decide whether he considers himself an Indian.
While the individual-identification approach may provide a quick and
simple analysis for the courts, it essentially allows the defendant to control his
own jurisdictional fate. Whichever jurisdictional determination is more
favorable to the defendant dictates his response to whether he considers
himself an Indian. This type of power and control should not be afforded to
an individual facing conviction. Whether an individual qualifies as an Indian
is for a non-partisan body to decide, to prevent opening doors to possible
allegations of fraud and abuse. While this test places some limitations on the
individual because he still must satisfy a blood requirement, such limitations
do not preclude the potential for abuse. If an individual does have Indian
blood, he could claim that he does or does not consider himself an Indian,
depending on which court would likely provide a more favorable outcome.
Those individuals who possess no Indian blood immediately would be
precluded from claiming Indian status because they do not satisfy the first
prong of the test. Whether those individuals consider themselves Indians
would be irrelevant.
By allowing defendants to control their fate through self-proclaimed Indian
status, the individual-identification approach would prove the least successful
and would allow for the greatest manipulation of the courts. Whether an
161. United States v. Pemberton. 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005).
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individual truly considers himself an Indian would become increasingly
difficult to certify on account of competing motivations. Self-identification as
an Indian could be a factor to be considered along with others, but should not
singlehandedly be dispositive of whether someone qualifies for Indian status.
B. Totality-of-the-Circumstances Approach
Another approach is a totality-of-the-circumstances test, under which a
court would consider the individual's ancestors, his tribal identification, and
his lifestyle. No single factor would be dispositive - they would all be
considered collectively.162 After considering the totality of the circumstances,
the court would be able to determine whether the individual qualifies for
Indian status.
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach would allow those individuals
living an Indian lifestyle but not satisfying the requisite blood requirement to
achieve Indian status. Individuals would be able to compensate for their
inadequate amount of Indian blood by demonstrating that they have
maintained an Indian lifestyle by living on the reservation, participating in
tribal activities, and taking advantage of services reserved solely for Indians.
This approach would allow individuals immediately foreclosed under other
tests because of their inadequate blood amount to qualify for Indian status,
while simultaneously allowing courts the ability to siphon those individuals
possessing the requisite blood but failing to maintain an Indian lifestyle.
Robert N. Clinton explains that "[t]he assumption made to justify the totality
of the circumstances test is that special jurisdictional arrangements for Indians
exist solely to protect them as individuals until such time as they take on the
habits of civilization, and assimilate into the population as a whole."I6 3
Courts would evaluate all the circumstances in concert, giving courts much
more freedom, which could be interpreted as a strength or a drawback. Courts
would be able to examine the evidence as they see fit and come to a conclusion
they believe to be just, but by giving the courts so much deference, there is yet
again the potential for inconsistent and subjective holdings.
While the totality-of-the-circumstances approach is appealing when one
contemplates reservation inhabitants with low blood quantums, there is
concern with affording courts the power to deny Indian status to a full-blooded
enrolled tribal member who decided to assume a non-Indian lifestyle. Such
individuals, who are generally recognized as Indians, would be denied Indian
status because they have chosen to integrate into the "mainstream" population.
162. Clinton, supra note 34, at 517-18.
163. Id. at 518.
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Clinton writes that this type of approach captures too narrow a view of the
reasons for federal jurisdictional arrangements, and that the choice to assume
a "non-Indian lifestyle should not be dispositive of [one's] status as an
Indian."' 64
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach provides the courts a wide range
of discretion in deciding whether an individual qualifies as an Indian for
federal criminal jurisdictional purposes. A court can take all factors into
consideration but still give more weight to those factors it considers more
important. The approach also allows the court to fashion more exceptions
because it ultimately has unbridled discretion. For instance, an individual who
may not have the requisite blood to meet the racial component under another
approach would still be able to have Indian status if living an Indian lifestyle.
Minor technicalities would not prevent those individuals who truly are
"Indian" from having that status for jurisdictional purposes. The totality-of-
the-circumstances approach, however, would likely produce the most
inconsistent results of all the approaches. There are no guidelines to be
followed by the courts, which will only lead to more disparate holdings.
It is clear from the long line of cases discussed that courts should not be
afforded such unrestrained freedom because it engenders erratic results. Each
court will ultimately place more emphasis on one factor than another and the
choice of that heavily weighted factor will vary from court to court. Some
courts may find that having a high blood quantum is the most important factor,
while other courts may place the greatest weight on whether the individual is
enrolled in a tribe. The totality-of-the-circumstances test would only
perpetuate the problem of inconsistent holdings and would provide no
constructive guidance for the courts to determine whether an individual
qualifies for Indian status.
C. United States v. Rogers Test
Another alternative would be to use a variation of the test already followed
by many courts: the Rogers test. The test includes two prongs. The first
requires that the individual "have some degree of Indian blood" and the second
requires that the individual "be recognized as an Indian by the Indian tribe
and/or the Federal government.",6 5 If the courts adopt this approach, more
definite guidelines must be established.
164. Id. at 519.




The courts have used substantial, sufficient, significant, and some in their
descriptions of the requisite amount of Indian blood.'66 These terms are vague
and provide little guidance, leading to inconsistent holdings. Some courts
have tried to clarify exactly what the terms mean. The court in Bruce stated
that evidence of an ancestor identified as an Indian would be adequate to prove
Indian blood.167 This explanation only further complicates the process because
the courts are now left to determine whether the defendant's ancestor was
identified as an Indian - a task equally if not more difficult than proving the
defendant himself is identified as an Indian, especially if that ancestor is no
longer alive.
Congress should set a minimum blood-quantum requirement. While courts
did vary, it appears that having more than one-sixteenth (1/16) Indian blood
should be the minimum requirement for the first prong of the Rogers test. The
individual must be able to provide some concrete proof to establish his degree
of Indian blood. Mere testimony stating what degree of Indian blood the
individual has, without more, should be deemed insufficient.
In an Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals case, the appellant was allowed
to prove his Indian-blood quantum by providing his parents' testimony that he
had slightly less than one-quarter (1/4) Indian blood.'68  Allowing an
individual to prove his degree of Indian blood through testimony alone opens
the door to inaccurate representations of blood quantum to achieve a status that
is most personally advantageous at that time. In addition, that the appellant's
parents provided the testimony"' further undermines its credibility because an
individual's parents ostensibly have far greater incentive to lie to protect their
children. While it may seem a hefty burden, there should be verified
documents from the tribe or the government that provide reliable and accurate
proof of the individual's degree of Indian blood.
Under the second prong (whether the individual has been recognized as an
Indian by a tribe or the federal government), courts have vacillated in their
analysis. The analysis needs to be structured. Applying the factors set forth
in St. Cloudy. United States would provide an expedient formula for the courts
to follow.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2009); State v. Reber, 171 P.3d 406, 410 (Utah 2007);
Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 79 (Wyo. 1982).
167. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005).
168. Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
169. Id.
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In declining order of importance, these factors are: 1) enrollment
in a tribe; 2) government recognition formally and informally
through providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians;
3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition
as an Indian through living on a reservation and participating in
Indian social life.' 70
Courts have examined these factors differently, but should consider them in
declining order of importance, placing the most emphasis on whether the
individual is enrolled in the tribe. William Canby notes that "enrollment is
often the key to acceptance as a member of the tribal community, and it
provides by far the best evidence of Indian status.""'7 Enrollment in a federally
recognized tribe is likely sufficient for an individual to satisfy the second
prong. Proof could be provided through presentation of a tribal-identification
card or testimony from the tribe verifying the individual's enrollment.172
One strength of the Rogers test is familiarity. Many courts already use the
test, which would make its universal application easier to implement. While
this test is more complex, it is structured and would likely lead to consistent
findings by the courts if the courts strictly adhered to the guidelines,
considering the factors in declining order of importance. By setting a
minimum blood requirement, courts would no longer be left with the sensitive
and largely arbitrary decision of whether an individual has sufficient blood to
qualify for Indian status. By permanently implementing the St. Cloud factors
as part of the second prong, courts no longer have to wrestle with the question
of what exactly determines whether an individual is recognized as an Indian
by a tribe or the federal government.
Before, courts were basing their decisions on what factors they deemed
important, resulting in inconsistent, subjective holdings. By placing the
factors in declining order of importance, it reminds the courts that being
enrolled in a tribe is the strongest evidence that an individual qualifies for
Indian status. Even if the individual is not enrolled in a tribe, the other factors
provide the courts with guidance concerning how to structure their analysis.
170. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
171. CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 11.
172. See United States v. Ramirez, 537 F.3d 1075, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2008) (allowing
enrollment to be proven through presentation of a tribal-identification card, certificates
indicating eligibility for enrollment and that his name had been placed on the membership roll,
and an explanation from the tribe that defendant lived on the reservation where only members




The Rogers test allows for what the bright-line test does not - a
consideration of more than one aspect in formulating a status determination.
First, the courts can make a race-based decision considering only the
individual's amount of Indian blood. The second prong allows the courts to
evaluate the individual from a non-racial perspective, examining his lifestyle
and determining whether the federal government or a tribe recognizes him as
Indian. Providing this two-step process helps ensure that individuals receiving
Indian status are both racially Indian and have embraced the Indian lifestyle
by living on the reservation or enrolling in a tribe. These dual requirements
make it more difficult for an individual to claim Indian status as a matter of
convenience.
The adapted Rogers test nonetheless has its drawbacks. First, by setting the
minimum Indian-blood requirement at greater than one-sixteenth (1/16), there
is the potential that tribal members could fail to satisfy the congressionally
mandated minimum amount for Indian status, despite that their tribes do not
require such a high percentage for membership. For instance, the Cherokee
Nation grants membership to those with any degree of Cherokee Indian
blood.'73 Therefore, an individual who is a member of the Cherokee Nation
and meets the second prong of the test potentially would be unable to meet the
first prong of the test if his degree of Indian blood were one-sixteenth (1/16)
or less.
Another drawback is that the second prong of the Rogers test could still be
applied inconsistently. While the factors do provide guidance, the
determination of whether an individual's activities and lifestyle are sufficient
to qualify him for Indian status is subjective. In United States v. Cruz, the
majority found that an individual did not qualify for Indian status because he
did not take advantage of available tribal benefits.'74 The dissent argued the
contrary - that the individual did qualify for Indian status because the proper
test is whether the tribe recognized him as an Indian.'75 The dissent found that
he never took advantage of the benefits immaterial; that they were available
to him was dispositive."' Conversely, in United States v. Bruce, an individual
who barely satisfied one of the factors was found to have Indian status."' The
173. TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP, supra note 158.
174. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2009).
175. Id. at 852 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2005) (individual partially
satisfies fourth factor by living on Indian reservation but does not fully participate in Indian
social life beyond that).
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dissent fiercely disagreed, claiming the majority's ruling allowed the
individual, based on the same set of facts, to claim he was not an Indian,'
depending on which was more convenient. The court in Goforth v. State did
not allow the individual the ability affirmatively to claim either status,
explaining that a determination that the defendant did have Indian status would
effectively give the defendant the ability to declare Indian heritage as a matter
of convenience when it was necessary to avoid state criminal action.'7 9
Courts must make certain that they are not affording an individual the
opportunity to claim Indian status only as a matter of convenience. Under the
Rogers test, courts are still charged with the responsibility of determining
whether an individual qualifies as an Indian.' While this approach appears
fair, the problem still remains that a small group of presumably non-Indian
arbiters unfamiliar with the Indian circumstance are making the determination
as to whether they believe the individual before them qualifies as an Indian.
A final drawback to consider is the test's complexity in application. It will
take substantial time and resources for a court to gather and evaluate the
necessary information, taking into account policy considerations and trying to
formulate its own definition of what exactly constitutes an "Indian" lifestyle.
With all of these concerns, one must consider the possibility of a better test to
evaluate whether an individual qualifies for Indian status.
D. Threshold-Question Approach
Another option is the threshold-question approach, similar to the one used
by the court in LaPier v. McCormick, under which courts ask an initial
threshold question before engaging in further analysis. Courts first ask
whether "the Indian group with which [the defendant] claims affiliation [is] a
federally acknowledged Indian tribe."' 8 ' If the answer is no, the inquiry ends
and the individual does not qualify for Indian status because the federal
government only assumed the responsibility to protect those tribes that are
federally recognized.' 82 The criminal jurisdiction statutes carrying out the
federal government's responsibilities therefore would not apply.
If the individual claims affiliation with a federally recognized tribe, the
court must then determine whether the individual is enrolled in that tribe. If
so, the inquiry ends and the individual receives Indian status because tribal
178. Id. at 1231 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
179. 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
180. United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984).
181. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1993).




membership in a federally recognized tribe is the most palpable evidence of
Indian status.'8 1 If the individual is not enrolled in the tribe, the court should
conduct a two-part inquiry similar to that found in the Rogers test, first
considering the degree of Indian blood and then examining whether the
individual is recognized as an Indian by a tribe.'" To guide this analysis, the
courts can consider whether the individual has received any benefits from the
government reserved only for Indians, whether he is socially recognized as an
Indian through his activities, and whether he is enjoying the benefits of tribal
affiliation. These factors should all be considered together in making the
decision.
One of the strengths of the threshold-question approach is that it provides
a step-by-step inquiry, moving on to the next step only when the previous has
been satisfied. This can prove to be time-saving for courts that may otherwise
conduct a full analysis only to realize the tribe in which the individual is
claiming affiliation is not federally recognized. Federal recognition of the
tribe appears to be the most important factor because the special trust
relationship between the federal government and the Native Americans is the
very reason these criminal jurisdiction statutes exist.' This approach allows
federal recognition to be addressed before considering any other factor.
Moreover, making the threshold question its own separate inquiry places
greater importance on federal recognition and helps courts to avoid confusing
the importance of each factor. If the individual is not an enrolled member of
a federally recognized tribe, the court is able to consider the remaining factors
equally, all the while remembering that the individual is not enrolled in a tribe
and strong evidence is therefore required to justify conferring Indian status
upon him.
The threshold-question approach leaves open the possibility that an
individual may claim Indian status only when it is personally beneficial. It
also opens the door to a larger number of individuals being able to claim
Indian status because there is no membership or eligibility-for-membership
183. See id. at 11.
184. Courts are careful not to conflate tribal enrollment and tribal recognition. They
appreciate that individuals are often recognized as "Indian" by the tribes despite lack of official
enrollment. See Lewis v. State, 55 P.3d 875, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) ("[E]nrollment in a tribe
is not an absolute requirement for recognition as an Indian."); United States v. Stymiest, 581
F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[Ejnrollment 'is not the only means [of establishing Indian
status] nor is it necessarily determinative."') (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656,660 (8th Cir. 2005)); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 987 (Mont. 1990)
("[T]hat Mr. LaPier is not enrolled in any tribe may not be determinative of Indian status.").
185. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D. 1988).
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requirement. The requirement is simply that one be affiliated with a federally
recognized tribe.'
While the threshold-question approach does provide a simple step-by-step
inquiry, it nonetheless has the potential to provoke a long, drawn-out,
subjective analysis, leading to inconsistent holdings. The threshold-question
approach also presents some of the same drawbacks as the adapted Rogers
approach. Although the court is supposed to weigh the evidence evenly, there
is still the potential for a court to place more emphasis on one factor than
another. There is also the problem attendant to having an unspecified blood
requirement, elaborated above in the discussion of the Rogers test. If the
legislature fails to set a specific requirement for Indian blood, the courts are
left with the question of what is adequate. As evidenced by the case law,
courts have failed to reach a consensus in determining a standard for whether
an individual has the requisite degree of Indian blood.
E. Bright-Line Test
A final alternative to consider in determining Indian status for purposes of
federal criminal jurisdiction is a bright-line test, which would simply ask one
question: whether the individual is a member of a federally recognized tribe.
If the individual is a member of a federally recognized tribe, he qualifies for
Indian status. This approach would leave the decision in the hands of the
tribes. It is similar to the one espoused by the dissent in Bruce, which reduced
the inquiry simply to "whether the individual is enrolled or eligible for
enrollment in a federally recognized tribe."' 8 ' There is a possibility that the
inquiry could be expanded to include those individuals eligible for
membership in a federally recognized tribe, but it is important for the courts
to keep in mind a notable point made by the court in United States v. Keys:
"[ilf an adult or older child is eligible to enroll in an Indian tribe but fails to do
so, perhaps an inference can be drawn that the individual intentionally chooses
not to affiliate politically with the tribe."'" While this may not be the case for
all individuals eligible for enrollment but not enrolled, it is certainly a notable
consideration for the courts.
One strength of a bright-line test is that the courts would not be responsible
for determining whether an individual qualifies as an Indian. As the court in
United States v. Cruz stated, "[T]here appears to be something odd about a
court of law . . . deciding whether a specific individual is or is not an
186. LaPier, 986 F.2d at 304-05.
187. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005).




'Indian.""8 9 Determining whether a specific individual racially belongs to a
certain group is not within the province of the courts' expertise and should be
left to the Indians or specific tribe. The tribe knows best whether an individual
has Indian blood or has been living an Indian-lifestyle. How might a court,
presumably comprised of non-Indians, know what it means to live an Indian
lifestyle?
Another strength of a bright-line approach is its ability to prevent
individuals from claiming Indian status as a matter of convenience. If an
individual is allowed to claim Indian status without enrolling in a tribe, he
could just as easily claim non-Indian status as a matter of jurisdictional
convenience. An individual should not claim Indian status as a subterfuge to
jurisdiction, but rather because it is who he is and the lifestyle he has
embraced.
Under the bright-line approach, courts would not be left with the task of
determining whether a certain percentage of blood is adequate for Indian
status. How is a non-tribal court to determine what exactly is the arbitrary cut-
off between having and not having enough Indian blood? Tribes have
documented conceptions of how much blood is adequate for Indian status
because most tribes set forth in their constitutions the necessary percentage for
membership in the tribe.'9 0
Importantly, leaving the decision to each particular tribe would allow them
to exercise their sovereignty. Tribes have already established clear, definite
membership requirements, which allows for both consistency and objectivity.
There is no new information that would need to be gathered or created. When
a court is presented with an individual claiming Indian status, it would simply
have to defer to the tribe to determine whether that individual is a member.
The bright-line approach would also eliminate race as a factor for
determining Indian status. Several courts have expressed that race should not
be used in determining whether an individual qualifies as an Indian. In United
States v. Antelope,"' the Supreme Court of the United States explained that the
regulation of Indians is based on their "unique status ... as 'a separate people'
with their own political institutions," and the question of whether an individual
qualifies as an Indian therefore is a political rather than a racial inquiry.'9 2
Further, the Court explained that the "respondents were not subjected to
federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because
189. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2009).
190. Dussias, supra note 159, at 86.
191. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
192. Id. at 646 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974)).
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they are enrolled members" of a federally recognized tribe.1 3 Because the
inquiry is instead a political question, the tribes should be afforded the
opportunity to determine their own membership, which is best evidenced by
an individual's enrollment in a tribe. 194
A tribe failing to enroll an individual or failing to consider him eligible for
enrollment should be sufficient evidence that the individual does not qualify
for Indian status. In Justice Rooney's concurring opinion in Vialpando v.
State, he expressed his belief that "[r]ace or national origin should not be a
determinant affecting the status of any individual."' 95  If the federal
government continues to promote tribal sovereignty, the tribes should be
provided the opportunity to exercise that sovereignty by making the
determination of who are their own members and citizens, evidenced through
enrollment in a tribe. Whether an individual has enough blood to qualify as
an Indian is not a question for the state and federal courts to decide. The
determination should be left to the tribe to acknowledge whether an individual
is or is not a member of its tribal community.
While the simplicity of this approach is appealing, it also precludes the
consideration of circumstances that may have prevented an individual from
being able to join a tribe. Some tribes will not let an individual receive
membership - even if he otherwise qualifies - if that individual was previously
a member of another tribe.' While the individual may have a large degree of
Indian blood and still practice an Indian lifestyle, he is unable to obtain
membership because of the tribe's laws. This type of individual, who would
clearly appear to be an Indian, would be unable to receive Indian status
because of tribal law, and not because the individual is not truly an Indian.
An individual may also be prevented from enrolling in a tribe because of a
refusal by the enrolling officer, as in Pero v. Pero.197 As the court expressed
in Pero, a "refusal by the Department of Interior to enroll a certain Indian as
a member of a certain tribe is not necessarily an administrative determination
that the person is not an Indian."1 98 An individual's Indian status cannot be
determined by the refusal of another individual to place his name on the tribal
roll.
193. Id. at 646.
194. CANBY, JR., supra note 14, at 11.
195. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 81 (Wyo. 1982) (Rooney, J., concurring).
196. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (D.S.D. 1988).
197. 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938).




Another reason an individual may not have tribal membership is because
she is too young to enroll. In Keys, the child was only two years old and not
capable of enrolling herself in a tribe.'" The child cannot be penalized for the
failure of her mother or father to enroll her in a tribe when she was too young
to do so herself. In this type of situation, there could be an age exception to
the bright-line rule: if the individual is below a certain age, her failure to enroll
in a tribe will not automatically preclude Indian status. In such a case, the test
is no longer a bright-line rule because subsequent analysis will be necessary
to determine whether the individual is eligible for membership.
A point of contention under the bright-line test is reiterated throughout the
cases, which indicate that membership in a tribe is not necessary for Indian
status. The majority in Bruce disputed the suggestion to base Indian status
solely on tribal membership;2" however, the majority was unable to provide
a solid justification for its opinion. The majority did agree that this type of test
would provide a simpler framework to determine Indian status. Its argument
for not using the test was simply that it was not the test it had adopted. It
further explained that until Congress or the Supreme Court revised the second
prong of the Rogers test, it would be "bound by [its] prior jurisprudence."2 0 1
The explanation provided by the Bruce court suggests that even though most
courts believe that enrollment is not required, Congress can change that and
require tribal membership through statute.202
Although courts have espoused that membership is not required to qualify
as an Indian, the dissent in Bruce makes a valid point that should be
contemplated. Courts have held that if a tribe is terminated or loses federal
recognition, the members of that tribe no longer have Indian status. The same
courts have also noted that even if an individual is not enrolled in a tribe or
eligible for enrollment, he could nonetheless qualify for Indian status. The
dissent in Bruce finds this suggestion illogical.203 If an individual who lived
his life as an enrolled tribe member loses his status as an Indian simply
because his tribe is terminated, then an individual who is not enrolled or
eligible to enroll should not still be afforded the opportunity to qualify for
Indian status. Indian status should be available only to those who are enrolled
in a tribe or deemed eligible for enrollment by the tribe. By using the bright-
199. United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1996).
200. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005).
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 1234 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
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line test, the analysis would be simplified and result in more consistent
holdings.
IV Conclusion
Congress has put the courts in an unenviable position, leaving them to make
subjective determinations of whether an individual qualifies as an Indian for
purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. There is currently no single
definition provided under the Indian Country Crimes Act or Major Crimes Act
for courts to follow when conducting their analysis. Courts have tried to
develop their own tests, and as a result, the holdings have been inconsistent.
Even courts applying the same test evaluate the factors differently and
ultimately reach inconsistent conclusions. A uniform approach must be
adopted, as conferring Indian status is more than a simple labeling - it is a
determination with sizeable legal consequences. Congress must determine
what definition of Indian best meets the goal of fostering judicial consistency,
and subsequently provide guidance to the courts regarding how to conduct the
evaluation. There are many approaches that could be used, but a single,
uniform approach must be selected to ensure dependable holdings consistent
with the underlying purpose of the criminal jurisdiction statutes.
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